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Abstract
The article critically evaluates the theory of the humanisa-
tion of international law. First, it argues that despite human
rights having impact on (other areas of) international law,
this trend has in the past been somewhat inflated. A num-
ber of examples are given where human rights have been
tested against other objectives pursued by international law,
with humanisation revealing its limits and actual dimensions.
The second argument consists in identifying and highlight-
ing obligations erga omnes (partes) and the principle of due
diligence as two ‘systemic’ tools, that are central to the
humanisation of international law. Both these tools form
part of modern positive law, but may also make a positive
contribution towards the direction of deeper humanisation
in international law, having the potential, inter alia, to limit
state will, establish occasional material normative hierarchy
consisting in conditional priority in the fulfilment of human
rights, give a communitarian tone to international law and
invite states to be pro-active in the collective protection of
their common interests and values. In its conclusions, the
article offers a plausible explanation about the paradox it
identifies of the limits of the humanisation on the one hand,
and its potential for further development on the other. For,
it is inherent in international law that the line separating the
law from deontology is thin. The process of humanisation
needs to be balanced with the other objectives of interna-
tional law as well as reconciled with the decentralised and
sovereignist origins of the pluralistic international legal sys-
tem.
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1. Introduction
This article seeks to critically evaluate the idea of the
humanisation of international law. During the last two
decades, eminent scholars from both sides of the Atlan-
tic have argued that international law is undergoing a
profound transformation owing to the impact that
human rights have on general international law and its
special regimes.1 Although not all scholars agree as to
the extent of that impact, there seems to be a consensus
that, indeed, human rights are a source of change in
international law.
1. B. Simma was one of the first to study the interaction between general
international law and human rights in his course at the Academy of
European Law at the EUI. B. Simma, International Human Rights and
General International Law: A Comparative Analysis, The Protection of
Human Rights in Europe, 1993, IV/2, 153-236, Collected courses of the
Academy of European Law. Judge B. Simma devoted his general course
at the Hague Academy in 2009 to ‘The Impact of Human Rights on
International Law’. This is also the case of Judge T. Meron, who pub-
lished an extended version of his general course in the Hague Academy
in 2003: T. Meron, ‘The Humanization of International Law’ (2006); as
well as of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, who discussed this very same
question as part of his own general course in The Hague: A.A. Cançado
Trindade, ‘International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Genti-
um’ (2010) For a collection of essays on the topic, see: M.T. Kamminga
and M. Scheinin (eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General
International Law (2009). See also the very comprehensive overview by
M.T. Kamminga, ‘Humanisation of International Law’, in I. Boerefijn
and J.E. Goldschmidt (eds.), Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and
Human Rights. Essays in Honour of Cees Flinterman (2008), at 29-40.
Recently, the Judge at the ECtHR, L.A. Sicilianos, treated the same top-
ic, in Greek. The Human Dimension of International Law. Interactions
Between General International Law and Human Rights (2010). Charac-
teristic of the ‘trend’ in scholarship is also the number of papers discus-
sing the way human rights are affecting other areas of international
law. Just to give a few examples: P. Dupuy, E. Petersmann & F. Francio-
ni (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law (2009);
U. Kriebaum (ed.), ‘Aligning Human Rights and Investment Protection’,
Transnational Dispute Management, special issue, (2013); B. Simma,
‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: a Place for Human Rights?’ 60 Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly 573 (2011); A.A. Cançado Trin-
dade, ‘The Humanization of Consular Law: The Impact of Advisory
Opinion No. 16 (1999) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
on International Case-law and Practice’, 6 Chinese Journal of Interna-
tional Law, at 1-16 (2007); Z. Drnas de Clément, ‘The Humanisation of
International Courts’, in B. Vukas and T.M. Šošić (eds.), International
Law: New Actors, New Concepts, Continuing Dilemmas: Liber Amico-
rum Božidar Bakotić (2010), at 397-408.
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The article, in the theory of the humanisation of inter-
national law, observes a narrative purporting to depict
‘the law as it is’, that is, to identify the ways positive
international law is changing because of human rights,
to capture the evolution that its humanisation has gener-
ated and, mainly, to illustrate the influence the latter has
on the international legal order. In that sense, the theory
of humanisation can be seen as contiguous or, to a cer-
tain extent, complementary to the other relevant ‘big’
theory, namely, the constitutionalisation of international
law.2
That second theory defends the idea of the existence of
a number of foundational international norms, which
provide the basis for an empirically observable trend
leading to the constitutionalisation of the international
order. Although no consensus exists as to what these
‘cosmopolitan’ norms are, since they vary from impera-
tive norms to the UN Charter or to the constitutionali-
sation of some of the special regimes of international
law, such as WTO law or the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) system, the constitutionalist
paradigm differs from the theory of humanisation (inter
alia) in that it does not only understand these constitu-
tional features as positive law.3 They also provide the
basis for the expansion (through various means, includ-
ing interpretation) of the constitutional model into new
areas, with a view to boosting certain normative ideals,
such as democracy. The international ‘constitution’ can-
not be but informal. By the means of an (somewhat
exaggerated)4 analogy, it borrows its name from national
constitutionalism. The symbolism is evident. Yet, be
they different, the two levels of constitutionalism are
not entirely disconnected. The same forces of globalisa-
tion that challenge domestic constitutions (if not sover-
eignty as such) generate (the need for, that is, a demand
for) constitutionalisation at the global, highly pluralistic
level, where new varieties of ‘centrifugal’ power are
actually exercised. Yet, constitutionalism appears to be
aware of the fact that it is called to operate – at both the
positive and the teleology-driven normative levels –
2. Among other, see the recent books by J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman
(eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and
Global Governance (2009); J. Klabbers, A. Peters & G. Ulfstein, The
Constitutionalization of International Law (2009); B. Fassbender, The
United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Com-
munity (2009), as well as G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The
Worlds of European Constitutionalism (2011). See also, Chapter 8,
entitled ‘Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a
Chance?’, in J. Habermas (C. Cronin ed. & tr.), The Divided West
(2006), at 115-193. For a brief assessment of the constitutionalization
of international law, see A. Peters, ‘Are We Moving Towards Constitu-
tionalization of the World Community’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing
Utopia. The Future of International Law (2012), at 118-135, as well as
E. De Wet, ‘The Constitutionalization of Public International Law’, in
M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative
Constitutional Law (2012), at 1209-1230.
3. With the exception of the functional approach to constitutionalism,
which observes the phenomenon in neutral terms, only focusing on the
function of the “constitutional” rules.
4. See the critical observations in that respect by Nicholas Tsagourias:
‘Introduction – Constitutionalism: a theoretical roadmap’, in N. Tsagou-
rias (ed.), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European
Perspectives (2007), especially at 4-5.
within a decentralised system that mainly relies on the
consent of its ‘actors’.
Other than the object of the humanisation of interna-
tional, human rights are one of the ‘ingredients’ of the
constitutionalisation of international law. These theories
are two separate but adjoining ways to see ‘modern’
international law, to explain the prevailing trends, as
well as to understand the dynamism and the forces of
change within it. Be they distinctive, they cover a com-
mon territory, sharing the following two key elements:
the idea of the emergence at the international level of an
increasingly tangible core, that is, a ‘noyau dur’, as well
as the erosion of sovereignty because of the informal
quasi-verticalisation of the system, which, because of its
voluntarist origins and the rule of sovereign equality,
has traditionally been conceived as – and has indeed
been – merely horizontal. As such, the constitutionalisa-
tion of international law, even if crossing the idea of
humanisation, will not focus on it exclusively. However,
much of what can be said about humanisation can also
encompass the idea of constitutionalisation, at least to
the extent of their shared characteristics.
This brief comparative overview aims to highlight the
commonalities of the two theories. The article concerns
the common space they share; yet, it chooses to focus on
the humanisation of international law, as this theory
offers a more tangible basis. The empirical observation
of the ways – some of which are examined in the main
part of this study – human rights interact with other
regimes of international law and operate within general
international law, often affecting the systemic premises
of its order, render the argument about the tangibility of
the humanisation of international law more comprehen-
sible. The analysis that follows does not purport to
measure the impact of the humanisation (an intellectual
exercise that would require the use of quantitative
methods), but to critically assess some of its outcomes.
In that respect, the article will undertake a twofold task.
First, it will endeavour to demonstrate that the effect of
the humanisation of international law has been in the
past somehow overestimated. In a number of instances
the idea of an abundantly humanised international legal
order, that has drastically changed (if one wants to
remain neutral), or improved, because of/thanks to
human rights, has been overstated, if not misconstrued.
The humanisation of international law is gradually
revealing its limits and actual dimensions.
However, the message contained in this article is not
only critical of the account of the humanisation of inter-
national law. The second path the article follows is more
positive and constructive. It is argued that, despite its
recent shortcomings, the humanisation of international
law contains in its very essence a ‘core’, that is, a sys-
temic acquis, essentially consisting of two ‘groundwork’
tools, namely obligations erga omnes (partes, if the obli-
gation stems from a treaty) and the principle of due dili-
gence, which are both the reality of modern positive
international law, as well as a potential for further
humanisation – within the confines, of course, of a plu-
ralistic legal order that remains state-centric as well as
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constructed on the basis of sovereignty and state will as
the primary, but not exclusive,5 foundation of the nor-
mative force of its rules.
The article will evaluate humanisation along the lines of
the twofold argument outlined above. The second sec-
tion will undertake a critical assessment of the limits of
(and the misconceptions about) the humanisation of
international law. The third section will discuss what in
the eyes of the study constitutes the twofold systemic
acquis of the humanisation of international law, that is,
obligations erga omnes and due diligence. In that respect,
the article will distinguish between what is the lex lata
of that acquis, and what, to date, can only be seen as a
basis, that is to say, merely a potential, for further
humanisation – should this very process continue to
evolve and to impact on the systemic traits of such an
idiosyncratic legal order, as the international one. The
fourth and final section of the article will conclude by
suggesting a plausible explanation about the paradox
identified in the article of the limits of the humanisation
on the one hand, and its potential on the other.
2. The Humanisation of
International Law Revealing
Its Limits: From Utopia, Back
to Apology6
The first path taken by the article aims to discuss in a
critical mode the theory of humanisation and to point to
a number of recent instances where this has proven to
be more ambitious than it could truly afford. The idea
here is that, even if human rights have a certain impact
on (other areas of) international law, this trend has been
inflated. If this is true, then we must admit that, to a
certain degree, A. Pellet was right to accuse some of his
colleagues of confusing their desires – that is, their
ideology – with the law, or in different terms the lex fer-
enda with the lex lata.7 Indeed, this has been proven to
be the case in a number of areas of law, such as immuni-
ties, diplomatic protection and, of course, invalid reser-
vations. With their relatively recent practice, the Inter-
national Law Commission (ILC), as well as a number of
international judicial fora, exercised authority and
5. On international voluntarism and the opposing schools of thought
arguing that state will is not the (exclusive) source of the binding force
of international law, see E. Jouannet, ‘A Century of French International
Law Scholarship’, 61 Maine Law Review 83 (2009) (especially the theo-
ry of sociological objectivism, pp. 95 et seq.).
6. Referring to the homonymous work by Koskenniemi: M. Koskenniemi,
From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of the International Legal
Argument (2005).
7. A. Pellet, ‘“Human Rightism” and International Law’, 10 Italian Year-
book of International Law 3 (2000), especially 5. For a similar critique
against constitutionalism this time, see J. Kammerhofer, ‘Constitutional-
ism and the Myth of Practical Reason: Kelsenian Responses to Meth-
odological Problems’, 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 723
(2010).
refused to validate the alleged humanisation of the
named areas of international law.
2.1. Empirical Observation: Humanisation
Reaching a Limit
The limited scope of the article does not allow for an in-
depth analysis of the examples given above. As far as
reservations to treaties are concerned, suffice it to
remind that the conclusion the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) reached in Loizidou opened an
animated debate on the effect of invalid reservations.8
The court examined in the merits the case before it,
although the respondent state’s reservation regarding its
competence was found to be invalid on the grounds of
its incompatibility with the ECHR’s ‘special’ object and
purpose.9 Thus, in the realm of the humanisation of
international law, the reserving state should remain
bound by the treaty without the benefit of its invalid
reservation. In the aftermath of Loizidou, the President
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accused the
court of Strasbourg of fragmenting international law.10
This has opened yet another debate, this time about the
so-called fragmentation of international law because of,
inter alia, the ‘specialty’ of human rights. The ILC
examined in detail the question of reservations and has
finally suggested that, in essence, there is no reason to
depart from the ‘règle d’or’ of international voluntarism.
The emphasis is put on state will.11 Under provi-
sion 4.5.3(4) of the ILC Guidelines
[i]f a treaty monitoring body expresses the view that a
reservation is invalid and the reserving State or inter-
national organisation intends not to be bound by the
treaty without the benefit of the reservation, it should
express its intention to that effect within a period of
twelve months from the date at which the treaty
monitoring body made its assessment.12
8. For a collection of essays on the issue of reservations to human rights
treaties, see I. Ziemele (ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and
the Vienna Convention Regime. Conflict, Harmony or Reconciliation
(2004). See also R. Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reserva-
tions, and State Consent’, 96 American Journal of International Law
531 (2002); as well as R. Moloney, ‘Incompatible Reservations to
Human Rights Treaties: Severability and the Problem of State Consent’,
5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 155 (2004).
9. Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 99, paras 70 et seq. especially
para. 93.
10. See the speech by the former President of the International Court of
Justice, Judge Gilbert Guillaume, ‘The Proliferation of International Judi-
cial Bodies: The Outlook for the International Legal Order.’ Speech to
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations,
27 October 2000. Available at <www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?
pr=85&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1> (last visited on 3 October 2012). See
also the critique made by another former President of the ICJ: R.Y. Jen-
nings ‘The Proliferation of Adjudicatory Bodies: Dangers and Possible
Answers”, in Implications of the Proliferation of International Adjudica-
tory Bodies for Dispute Resolution’ 9 ASIL Bulletin, at 5-6 (1995).
11. See Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-third Session
(2011) A/66/10/Add.1 at 534-535, para. 26 accusing the ECtHR of
“constructing state will”.
12. Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, adopted by the ILC at its
Sixty-third Session in 2011 A/66/10, para. 75.
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By the same token, the idea that the right to access to
justice should prevail over the ‘all time classic’ laws of
state immunities, so that human rights are effectively
protected and the individual is given the necessary
means to directly claim her/his rights and, thereby,
make states remedy the wrong they have caused to her/
him, has recently been rejected by both the ICJ and the
ECtHR – that is, the very same court that has been
accused in Loizidou of judicial activism in the name of
human rights specialty. According to the ECtHR, it is
proportionate to derogate from (that is, in that particu-
lar instance, to create an exception to) the right to access
to justice in order to give room to a rule promoting
‘comity and good relations between States through the
respect of another State’s sovereignty’.13 The wrongs14
access to justice sought to remedy in these particular
cases were of great material importance, sometimes even
translating into a very special and, thus, exceptional
type of rules, namely jus cogens. However, in the absence
of normative conflict15 between jus cogens, on the one
hand, and state immunities, on the other, the latter
should prevail over the ideals pursued by human rights
protection.
Yet, sovereign immunities are not the only case where
the humanisation of international law has been under-
mined. The same trend of counter-humanisation also
characterises the other pathway international law makes
available for the (indirect, this time) protection of the
rights of the individual at the international level, namely
diplomatic protection. The dynamic vision defended by
the ILC, calling for a codification that would also
embrace the progressive development of diplomatic pro-
tection, has crashed into the wall of international reality.
One needs only to compare the suggestion made by the
second Special Rapporteur, J. Dugard, that states
should be obliged to resort to diplomatic protection in
case of jus cogens violations,16 with the final version of
the ILC project. Ideas such as the one mentioned here
have either entirely disappeared or been downgraded to
a spineless form of recommendation, inviting states to
‘[g]ive due consideration to the possibility of exercising
13. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, (2002) 34 E.H.R.R 11, paras 54-56. See
also the ‘clone’ cases of Fogarty v. The United Kingdom, (2002) 34
E.H.R.R. 12, paras 35-36; and McElhinney v. Ireland (2002) 34 E.H.R.R.
13 paras 36-37, as well as, among other cases, Kalogeropoulou and
others v. Greece and Germany (ECtHR) (Admissibility) 59021/00,
12 December 2002.
14. Such as torture, or serious war crimes.
15. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State. (Germany v. Italy, Greece inter-
vening), ICJ Judgment of 3 February 2012 <www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/143/16883.pdf>, paras 93 et seq. The literature on that question is
particularly rich. Among others, see the analysis by D. Akande and
S. Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and For-
eign Domestic Courts’, 21 European Journal of International Law 815,
especially at 832 et seq (2010). See also, L.A. Sicilianos, ‘The Human
Face of International Law. Interactions Between General International
Law and Human Rights: An Overview’, 32 Human Rights Law Journal
1, at 3-4 (2012).
16. First Report on Diplomatic Protection by Mr. John R. Dugard, Special
Rapporteur. ILC, Fifty-second Session, 2000. A/CN. 4/506, Art. 4,
pp. 27 et seq., paras 75 et seq.
diplomatic protection, especially when a significant
injury has occurred’.17
What these instances all have in common is that the
humanisation of international law has proven to have
limits. The perception of an order giving unconditional
priority to human rights, which have, according to that
view, led to the drastic erosion of the classical founda-
tions of voluntarist sovereignism and have utterly dis-
placed bilateralism to the benefit of community inter-
ests18 (still?) belongs in all these instances to the world
of the normative ‘ought’. Humanisation is gradually
revealing its real dimensions. ‘Alas’, despite the well-
intentioned nature of its humanistic cause, international
law is resisting the change the ‘droitdeslhommistes’ claim
it to have undergone or call it to undergo.
2.2. Empirical Observation: The Side-effects of
‘Humanisation’
At the same time, one can diagnose another symptom of
legal shortsightedness, owed (among other reasons) to
the uncritical acceptance of the narrative about the deep
impact human rights – allegedly – have on international
law. What distinguishes that case from the previous
ones is that, indeed, human rights have been successful
in conflating international law with the (in that particu-
lar instance) by-products of their ‘special’ regime. How-
ever, far from humanising international law, these
by-products threaten to negatively affect the broader
system, as well as human rights protection at the global
level. The example that may be given in that respect is
the criterion of effective control as a condition for hold-
ing a state responsible for extraterritorial wrongfulness
directly attributable to it.19 The reasons why this cri-
terion is seen by the author of the article as groundless
in terms of positive international law cannot be
explained within the limited confines of this article.
Suffice it to underline that the ECtHR – that establish-
ed the standard with its case law – has explained that the
standard’s purpose is to preserve the regional scope of
the ECHR and to safeguard the so-called espace juridique
of the European system of first generation human rights
protection.20 In that particular context, effective control
is nothing other than an artificial barrier in defence of
regionalism. This is what ‘allows’ the ECtHR to depart
17. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, adopted by the ILC in its Sixty-
first Session. Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Ses-
sion, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10), Art. 19(4).
18. Referring to the homonymous course by B. Simma before the Hague
Academy: B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interests’, 250
RCADI 217 (1997).
19. Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 46,
para. 311, stating that ‘[t]he exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condi-
tion for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or
omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the
infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention’.
20. Banković and others v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United King-
dom, (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. SE5, para. 80.
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from the ILC norms on state responsibility21 and, in
essence, establish an extra condition, namely the cri-
terion of effective control, for holding responsible the
states that directly violate international human rights
law outside their borders. This is a barrier that has been
created by a regional court of human rights as a means
to territorially limit human rights protection on the
basis of jurisdiction. It goes without saying that, in the
absence of regionalism, the standard’s raison d’être
ceases to subsist. However, we observe that this very
standard has been uncritically adopted by fora that were
never designed to be regional. Thus, it has been – erro-
neously, in the author’s opinion – adopted by the ICJ,22
as well as by the UN Human Rights Committee.23 It
may be an irony, but Loizidou, for which Strasbourg has
been (as already explained) accused of fragmenting the
unity of international law, constructed a standard, the
criterion of effective control, which has contributed
both to the unity, as well as to the ‘anti-humanisation’ of
international law.
3. The Systemic ‘Core’ of the
Humanisation of
International Law
The second path taken by the article aims to offer a
more positive account of the theory of humanisation. Be
it someway inflated, the named theory constitutes at the
same time a ‘reality’ of international law – and this,
according to the article, is mainly for two reasons.
The first is quite evident. Because of human rights, the
individual is now included in all textbooks of interna-
tional law as a – passive,24 at least – subject of interna-
tional law who is, under certain conditions, entitled to
protection. International law is, literally, ‘humanised’ as
it now contains a mature set of substantive rules, as well
as an institutional apparatus, both regional and univer-
sal, for the safeguard of human rights. A paradigm shift
21. Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, adopted by the ILC on 10 August 2001: Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, Fifty-third Session, A/56/10, Chapter IV,
Art. 2, providing that the two elements of wrongfulness are the breach
of a rule by a state and attribution of that conduct to the state.
22. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 226, para. 109.
The ICJ referred to the HRC to hold that, because Israel exercises effec-
tive control, its jurisdiction extends to the occupied territories as well
(para. 110 regarding civil and political rights, para. 112 regarding social
and economic rights). See alsoCase Concerning Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo, (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, 168, para. 179, and paras 167 and 169,
reflecting a tendency to link responsibility for directly attributable to the
respondent state conduct with the control exercised by its organs acting
as occupying power.
23. UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment no. 31 [80],
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties
to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10.
24. See for instance J. Verhoeven, ‘Droit International Public’ (2000), at 295
et seq.
is said to exist, consisting in the gradual abandonment of
the classic conception of state sovereignty and “the
incorporation of humanitarian concerns […] as a crucial
element in the justification of state action”.25 Admitted-
ly, the normative framework is not equally developed
with respect to all subjects (if one wants to stick to the
jargon of positivism) of international law. The individu-
al, or, more generally, the private actor, are offered
more protection at the international level, than they
have obligations and responsibility.26 Nevertheless, legal
personality depends upon the needs of the society,27 and
it is these very ‘needs’ that led to the emergence of
international criminal law or to the – still immature –
law of soft human rights ‘obligations’ of multinational
corporations,28 to give two characteristic examples. The
road is still under construction and the idea of humani-
sation is an ongoing process.
Yet, all of this is well known. It is the second dimension
of the reality of the humanisation of international law
that the article wishes to emphasise. Thus, the argument
is that human rights have made a positive contribution
to the development of two invaluable ‘systemic tools’,
which both constitute at the same time a reality in the
international legal order, and a potential for further
change in the direction of the humanisation. Both these
tools extend well beyond human rights. Yet, in human
rights they found fertile ground for application. This is
what links them to human rights as a reality of positive
international law, as well as what makes them a basis,
that is, an opportunity for further humanisation.
As already explained in the introduction, as a reality,
these two tools constitute an aqcuis, forming part of
modern positive international law. As a potential/possi-
bility, the article argues that, although these systemic
tools remain underexplored (and to a certain degree
understudied), they do offer a number of opportunities
that could radically change the face of international law,
as we know it. However, as such, they only constitute a
lex ferenda. They are open to evolution and they are sus-
ceptible to and depend on the practice and the (ideolo-
gy-stemming) will of those (including the international
judge) who have the power to shape and change interna-
tional law.
3.1 The Erga-Omnesisation of International Law
3.1.1 Lex Lata
As far as the first systemic ‘apparatus’ is concerned, this
is closely linked to the development of human rights,
25. R. Teitel, Humanity’s law (2011) at 9 and 35 et seq.
26. In that respect, see: A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-
State Actors (2006).
27. According to the famous passage of the ICJ advisory opinion: Repara-
tion for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174, at 178.
28. Among others see Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’
Framework. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen-
eral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie. Human Rights Council Seven-
teenth session. A/HRC/17/31; as well as the UN Global Compact
<www.unglobalcompact.org> (last visited on 5 October 2012).
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although it does not only apply with regard to rules aim-
ing to protect the human being and its fundamental
rights. Obligations erga omnes (partes) are transforming
an otherwise bilateral(isable) international legal order,
which has traditionally been based on reciprocity29 and
individualism, into something much more close to the
idea of a community, wherein all states are entitled – but
not obliged – to protect what constitutes interests and
values that are common to everyone. They have entered
positive international law in a rather unexpected way,
through a revolutionary obiter dictum by the ICJ;30 yet,
erga omnes came to stay. They found their place in the
law of international responsibility and, as a result, all
states, even if not directly31 affected by wrongfulness,
are entitled to react against it and invoke the responsi-
bility of the offender.32 This is how a system moves
beyond reciprocity and merely synallagmatic relation-
ships33 and recognises the legitimate interest, translated
into a proper legal right, that each and every state has to
be actively engaged in the protection of collective inter-
ests. A traditionally sovereignist legal order based upon
the premises of reciprocity and self-protection34 allows
its community to protect its shared interests and values
in a collective way. This is the reality of obligations erga
omnes – or this is erga omnes as a reality of positive inter-
national law.
3.1.2 Lex Ferenda
However, it is the potential this special type of interna-
tional obligations has that mainly interests this article.
The argument here is that obligations erga omnes may
have far-reaching implications, allowing for change in a
number of areas of international law. They are opening
the way to further objectivisation and do have the
potential to fertilise the legal order with a series of inno-
vative elements that affect the very essence of its sys-
temic structure. The derivatives of that change vary. To
name but a few of them, these would concern several
domains of general international law, such as the infor-
29. On reciprocity see the very pertinent contribution by A. Paulus,
‘Whether Universal Values can Prevail over Bilateralism and Reciproci-
ty’, in Cassese (ed.) supra n. 2, at 91 et seq.
30. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Limited (Belgium v. Spain) Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970,
p. 3 at 32, para. 34.
31. The ILC opts for the term not injured states. (ILC Articles on the
Responsibility of States supra n. 21 at 116). The terms non-directly
affected, indirectly affected and not injured state, are used in the paper
interchangeably.
32. ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States, Art. 48. See also the critical
remarks by P.M. Dupuy on Art. 48. ‘The Deficiencies of the Law of
State Responsibility Relating to Breaches of “Obligations Owed to the
International Community as a Whole”: Suggestions for Avoiding the
Obsolescence of Aggravated Responsibility’ in Cassese, supra n. 2
at 210.
33. See the brief but apt comments by Judge Simma on the occasion of the
exceptio non adimpleti contractus in his separate opinion in Application
of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), ICJ Judgment of 5 December 2011
<www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf>, paras 10 et seq.
34. On the concept of self-protection or self-help, V. Tzevelekos ‘Vers la
reconnaissance d’un droit étatique à l’autoprotection? Entre le droit et
la politique’, 2 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 295
(2008).
mal hierarchy (of rules), jurisdiction, the obligation to
execute and to comply with international judgments,
etc.
Once again, the limited scope of the article does not
favour depth in the analysis. One would need a mono-
graph to introduce in detail the idea of the erga-
omnesisation of international law, but the bottom line of
the argument could be summarised in the following
way. The first step of the syllogism would be to recog-
nise the link between the material importance of certain
rules and the named class of obligations. Although the
formal hierarchy (of sources) is foreign to international
law,35 this does not mean that some rules are not created
for – that is, their ratio legis, their purpose or raison
d’être is – the protection of certain interests and ideals
that are thought to be of higher value,36 that is, more
important37 than other ones. This leads to a first set of
conclusions.
First, ideology is indeed of pertinence. It may be that
legal positivism prefers it to be hidden behind the veil of
the formal method that generates the rule, but, indeed,
what always feeds the rule is its underlying material.
This refers to the commonplace distinction between for-
mal and material sources in law making. Thus, outside
state interests (and the will to protect them),38 the mate-
rial source of international law may also be – for some
rules – the idea of social values (and the necessity to pro-
tect them).39
Second, the ‘box’ within which rules that seek to protect
values, such as human rights, or common interests, like
the protection of the environment, are placed is not
irrelevant to the characteristics and the architecture of
the system within which those rules were born, as well
as aimed to produce effects. International law is decen-
tralised. For it to maintain that very nature, but also be
able to accommodate areas such as the protection of
human rights, cultural heritage or the environment, it
needed to create a special type of rules that would ena-
ble each and every member of the community to be (if
they wish) involved in the protection of these, common
to all, values and interests. The reason erga omnes rules
are receiving that special treatment within international
law is of course their material content. However, the
protection of their material content needed to be recon-
ciled with (the preservation of) decentralisation. The
outcome of that combination is a category of obligations
owed erga omnes that recognise each and every state’s
faculty to actively protect the values that are common to
35. D. Shelton, ‘International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’’, in M.D.
Evans (ed.). International Law, 3rd ed., at 142-143.
36. Cf. the critical comments by J. d’Aspremont, calling scholarship to put
emphasis on common interests, rather than to values. J. d’Aspremont,
‘The Foundations of the International Legal Order’, 18 Finnish Year-
book of International Law 219 (2007).
37. C. Tams, ‘Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law’
(2005), at 136 et seq. See also A. Orakhelashvili, ‘Peremptory Norms in
International Law’ (2006) at 49: who discusses the links between mor-
ality and jus cogens norms.
38. Referring to the voluntarist view of international legal positivism.
39. Referring to the sociological objectivist view of international legal positi-
vism.
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them. Thereby, all states within the decentralised order
have their share in the protection.
Third, erga omnes is contributing a communitarian tone
in a society of individual sovereigns. Non-directly affec-
ted states are not (re)acting to the breach of an erga
omnes obligation with an aim to protect individual inter-
ests that are exclusive to them, but interests and values
that are common to their ensemble, that is, to the inter-
national community as a whole. This is how erga omnes
is making possible the passage from a society of individ-
uals into an – always decentralised – community of
‘stakeholders’. And this is how reciprocity cedes its
place to collective enforcement. In that respect, erga
omnes could be metaphorically understood as a special
‘capsule’ within which the system is placing only those
rules that are of significant material importance. This
very ‘capsule’ acts in the same time as a ‘vehicle’, intro-
ducing – through the ‘backdoor’ – the idea of communi-
ty within a decentralised order of sovereign individuals.
What will be the content of that ‘capsule’, that is to say
what are the rules that will be given the special effect of
erga omnes, is a question that goes beyond the article’s
scope. Questions such as what shapes trans-societal con-
sensus, what is societal consensus, if this is universal or
not, how can this be evidenced in a decentralised order
and which are the philosophical foundations of the
material content of these special rules escape the article,
if not legal positivism as such. In simple words, and,
although one cannot overlook the fact that erga omnes
are closely linked to human rights, for the article, it is
not the content of the ‘capsule’ that counts, but the
‘capsule’ as such. It is the systemic tool that has been
designed to encapsulate what, in the eyes of the society
(of a given society, at a given time), is seen as important
and worthy to be protected by each and every state act-
ing in the name of all. With no regard to the specific
content of the ‘capsule’, everything classified as erga
omnes bears a special weight, which, in less fragmented
and more integrated societies, is called public order. In
essence, – let us admit it – erga omnes is a tool vesting
with special legal effect rules of public order and, as
such, it is acting, in Hartian terms as an implicit rule of
recognition.40 As a society, we recognise that some values
and interests are more important and, for that reason,
we mark them as a distinctive category of rules. This is
the reason why these rules are given special legal effects.
The specialty, finally, of that effect depends on the
characteristics of the system – which in the case of inter-
national law happens to be decentralised.
This has two main consequences (i.e. community reac-
tion to wrongfulness and limitation of individual state
will) that are closely linked to the examples that were
given earlier and which also explain why the article sees
obligations erga omnes as an opportunity for profound,
structural humanisation of the international legal sys-
tem.
40. The author of the paper owes that idea to Dr. Kapotas.
• The Community’s Reaction to Wrongfulness:
Universal Jurisdiction
The idea of a community of interests for the protection
of public order rules gives all states the right to react to
wrongfulness – through lawful means, of course, and
within the limits set by the law. This is well established
in the framework of secondary obligations, giving, for
instance, the right to any state to resort to countermeas-
ures against the state that breaks an erga omnes obliga-
tion,41 or a locus standi to bring that state to justice.42
This is the lex lata of erga omnes; as such, it provides a
sufficient, albeit indirect, nexus between the state and
international wrongfulness. However, that very same
rationale may be also used to argue that the concept of
obligations erga omnes and the indirect links they set
between wrongfulness and third states (i.e. non-injured
states) may justify the exercise of universal jurisdiction43
by the domestic judicial authorities of any state in the
world – under the same terms and for the same reasons
that any state is allowed to invoke the international
responsibility of the subject that breaks an obligation it
owes erga omnes. In other words, it could be argued that
the breach of an obligation erga omnes justifies the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction – even when that form of
jurisdiction is not explicitly authorised by an interna-
tional treaty.44
In universal jurisdiction, the state exercises criminal or
even civil45 jurisdiction, that is, it brings under its sov-
ereignty by rendering its judiciary competent to adjudi-
cate a case that is under no circumstances (territorially,
personally or under the protective principle) linked to
its own order. The tools stem from the domestic legal
system, but there is equally a strong international ele-
ment. The exercise of jurisdiction in that context may
be seen as a unilateral46 (re)action to a breach of interna-
41. Art. 54, ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States.
42. Case Concerning East Timor, (Portugal v. Australia) Judgment, ICJ
Reports 1995, 90, especially para. 29.
43. For an overview, among others, see R. O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction:
Clarifying the Basic Concept’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Jus-
tice 735 (2004). For a comparative analysis of the various national poli-
cies/practices on the topic see L. Reydams, ‘Universal Jurisdiction’.
International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (2003).
44. See for instance the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) 1465 UNTS 85,
Art. 5(2), as well as the recent ICJ judgment in Questions Relating to
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite. (Belgium v. Senegal) ICJ,
Judgment of 20 July 2012 <www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
144/17064.pdf> and Ould Dah v. France (ECtHR, Admissibility)
13113/03, 17 March 2009; discussing the French criminal law on uni-
versal jurisdiction, empowering the French judiciary to ‘try the perpetra-
tor of an offence regardless of his of her nationality or that of the victim
and the place of the offence, subject to two conditions: the perpetrator
must be on French territory and must be tried in application of certain
international conventions’.
45. Among others, see the interesting analysis by D.F. Donovan and
A. Roberts, ‘The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction’,
100 American Journal of International Law 142 (2006).
46. For the distinction between unilateral universal jurisdiction and multilat-
eral, based on international agreements, see J. d’Aspremont, ‘Multilat-
eral Versus Unilateral Exercises of Universal Criminal Jurisdiction’, 43
Israel Law Review 301, at 305 et seq (2011). See also in the same
pages the critical comments by that author on the constitutional bias
that, in his view, characterises the debate about the exercise of jurisdic-
tion at the international level.
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tional law by a third subject who is not linked to (that is
to say, who is not directly affecting, nor injuring) the
reacting state. That state transforms its own judiciary
into a universal, ‘world’ forum that acts, not in order to
protect that state’s individual interests, but the interests
(and the values) of the international society. Yet, this is
exactly what erga omnes do as well. They authorise every
state to unilaterally react against the breach of an obliga-
tion owed erga omnes. Thereby, states seek to unilateral-
ly (and in the name of the society) protect interests and
values (translated into a special type of rules) that are
common to the society. Both counter-measures (to give
the most characteristic example of reaction against the
breach of an erga omnes rule) and universal jurisdiction
constitute a form of unilateral reaction to wrongfulness.
In both cases there is no direct link connecting wrong-
fulness with the reacting state. The analogy is noticea-
ble. If what authorises a non-injured state to react to
wrongfulness is the erga omnes quality of the norm, with
the latter being a condition for the former, then why not
to recognise that very same condition as the basis of uni-
versal jurisdiction as well? The logic and the raison d’être
of erga omnes as a distinctive class of rules may author-
ise/permit a state to react – by exercising jurisdiction –
to the breach of a rule that concerns/affects everyone,
including itself as a non-(directly) injured state.47 In
that sense, the condition for universal jurisdiction to be
permissible would be that the rule at issue has an erga
omnes character.
However, legitimate counterarguments exist. The anal-
ogy is far from perfect, as, in the former case, the reac-
tion is occurring at the international level and concerns
the relationship between two states, whereas in the case
of universal jurisdiction the offender is by definition a
subject that would not be covered by immunity (espe-
cially not another state) as the offender will have to be
placed under the jurisdiction (that is, under the sover-
eignty) of another state – a fact that may infringe the
sovereignty of the other involved states, and primarily of
the state of nationality. Second, it is debatable48 whether
obligations erga omnes are binding for non-state actors.49
Finally, the question of universal jurisdiction – both its
47. For a more detailed presentation of the argument in the context of the
Alien Tort Claims Act, see V. Tzevelekos, ‘In Search of Alternative Solu-
tions: Can the State of Origin Be Held Internationally Responsible for
Investors’ Human Rights Abuses Which Are Not Attributable to It?’, 35
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 155, at 208 et seq (2010).
48. See, however, the Institut de droit international Resolution on Obliga-
tions Erga Omnes in International Law (27 August 2005), suggesting
that ‘certain obligations bind all subjects of international law for the
purposes of maintaining the fundamental values of the international
community’.
49. However, these obligations are binding for the state, which, under due
diligence, has an obligation to protect them through positive measures.
See infra the arguments presented in the paper on the effect of due dili-
gence and its interaction with obligations erga omnes.
legality, as well as its extent –50 is far from settled in
international law.
Nonetheless, it is for all these reasons that universal
jurisdiction is mentioned here merely as an opportunity
offered by the ‘tool’ of obligations erga omnes for further
humanisation of international law. In other words, erga
omnes only establish the nexus between the non-injured
state and the wrongful conduct, that is, they provide a
justification in favour of universal jurisdiction. Whether
that form of jurisdiction is or will ever be allowed in
international law is, once again, a question that falls out-
side this article and which definitely escapes the author-
ity of its author, who is neither a judge, nor a state offi-
cial, whose practice could count as state practice.
• Limiting the Will of the State Uti Singuli
The second consequence of the concept of obligations
erga omnes is even more challenging. If, for the reasons
that have been already explained, this category of rules
is destined to allow the community of states to protect
what is of material importance to them (referring back
to the idea of a public order), then, the interests and val-
ues of the community should be able to limit the will of
the state uti singuli. After all, this is the meaning of a
public order, to restrict individual will. In international
law, this is the case of that limited number of absolute,
imperative, peremptory, intransgressible or whatever
these may be called obligations erga omnes that are also
known as jus cogens51 – which is (especially as far as trea-
ty law is concerned) the lex lata of international law.
But, once again, one may wonder if there is no room for
further development, as well as whether, in a system
such as the international one, nullity of conflicting rules
and prohibition of exceptions, limitations or derogations
(that is, the effect of jus cogens) are the only means for a
public order to limit the sovereign will of individual
states?
In that respect, the article can give two examples of the
far-reaching and still underexplored consequences that
obligations erga omnes may have for international law.
The first is the question of state will in the execution of
and compliance with international judgments; the sec-
ond is the hierarchy of rules and, in a sense, it is a pre-
requisite for the former.
• Execution of and Compliance with International
Judgments
As far as the first issue is concerned, it would be inter-
esting to give the example of a famous problem in logic,
namely the Protagoras’ Paradox of the Court. A young
pupil in ancient Greece, Euathlus, wanted to study with
50. See for instance the separate opinion of the former president of the ICJ,
Judge Guillaume, concluding that universal jurisdiction exists against
piracy. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), ICJ Reports 2002, 3, separate
opinion of Judge Guillaume at 37-38; as well the separate opinion of
Judge Koroma in the same case adding genocide and slave trade to the
list of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction. Ibid. at 61-62.
51. See the thorough analysis of M. Byers, ‘Conceptualising the Relation-
ship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules’, 66 Nordic Journal of
International Law 211 (1997).
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Protagoras and become an ‘attorney’. However, the stu-
dent could not afford the fees the famous sophist was
charging. The agreement they reached was that he
would only pay Protagoras for his instruction after he
had won his first case. Time passed and Euathlus was
neither paying his tutor nor practicing law. Protagoras
decided to claim the amount Euathlus owed him and
brought the case to court. Should Protagoras win the
case, the student would be obliged to compensate him
on the basis of the judgment. If the opposite scenario
were to come true and Euathlus won the case, Protago-
ras would still be paid on the basis of their original con-
tract. As it is easy to guess, the student’s views were
exactly the opposite, concluding that, either way, he
should be exempted from the obligation to pay.
The Protagoras’ Paradox of the Court introduces in the
most genuine way the dilemma between ‘private’ state
will and the autorité de la chose jugée. If one wishes to
emphasise sovereignty, then the agreement between two
states should suffice to allow them to depart from the
judgment of a court. How may obligations erga omnes be
relevant in that respect? If one agrees that, because of
their material weight, these rules (and not only jus
cogens) might (under the conditions that are explained
below) limit state will, then the agreement of the parties
to the dispute should not be of the power to permit them
to circumvent their secondary obligations – and espe-
cially those that relate to the ceasing of the illicit con-
duct52 and the adoption of measures of compliance
aimed to guarantee non-repetition,53 aiming to the so-
called substantive element of the compliance with an
international judgment.54 The concept of public order
does not allow a dispute to be ‘privatised’. This is
indeed the spirit of the ECHR when it sets conditions
for the friendly settlement of human rights disputes,55
limiting thereby the will of the parties and subordinat-
ing it to the authority of its court – and this may be seen
as an example as to how the idea presented here may
translate into lex lata. Yet, there is still plenty of space
for evolution, whereas the argument presented here
depends on the condition that, indeed, obligations erga
omnes may limit state will. This is what the next para-
graph discusses, arguing that obligations erga omnes
develop a ‘special’ type of material supremacy, which
translates into a conditional, occasional priority in fulfil-
ment.
52. Art. 30(a) ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States.
53. Art. 30(b), ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States.
54. In the context for instance of the ECHR, see Art. 46(1) ECHR and the
old, but always pertinent article by G. Cohen-Jonathan, ‘Quelques con-
sidérations sur l’autorité des arrêts de la Cour européenne des Droits de
l’Homme’, Liber amicorum Marc-André Eissen’ (1995) at 49-50.
55. Which must be done ‘on the basis of respect for human rights as
defined in the Convention’. Art. 39(1) ECHR. See also O. de Schutter,
‘Le règlement amiable dans la Convention européenne des droits de
l’homme: entre théorie de la fonction de juger et théorie de la négocia-
tion’, in Les droits de l’homme au seuil du troisième millénaire.
Mélanges en hommage à Pierre Lambert (2000) at 238-239.
• Hierarchy of Rules
Turning now to the question of hierarchy of rules, what
needs first to be underlined is that, although only very
few obligations erga omnes are jus cogens and, therefore,
in their vast majority erga omnes form part of jus disposi-
tivum, they distinguish, however, themselves from bilat-
eral or bilateralisable synallagmatic obligations in that
they are integral.56 This explains why they are ‘immune’
to reciprocity and, more generally, why they constitute
an extraordinary type of jus dispositivum, which is given
special effects. Leaving the territory of do ut des and
entering the world of “legitimate community interest[s]”57
entails consequences. The will of individual states ought
to be – somehow – limited against what is an interna-
tional public order, no matter whether this translates
into jus cogens or, simply, erga omnes.58
It is not within the intentions of the article to repeat an
argument that this author has already presented else-
where.59 In its general outline, the idea is simple. Yet,
before briefly presenting it, it is necessary to recognise
that the argument suggested here is far from established
in international law,60 as well as that it definitely goes
against the thesis defended by the ILC, which only dis-
tinguishes rules erga omnes because of their procedural
scope and consequences,61 that is, the faculty of every
state to react to wrongfulness.
Against that background, it is argued here that obliga-
tions erga omnes do develop a certain type of sui generis
56. For a comprehensive overview of the Fitzmauricean classification of
obligations, see J. Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obliga-
tions: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature’, 14 Euro-
pean Journal of International Law 911 (2003). The ILC on the other
hand makes a distinction between integral and inter-dependent obliga-
tions. Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries supra n. 21, pp. 117-118. See also
L.A. Sicilianos, ‘The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral
Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility’, 13 European
Journal of International Law 1127, at 1134 et seq (2002), as well as, by
the same author, ‘L’influence des droits de l’homme sur la structure du
droit international. La hiérarchisation de l’ordre juridique international’,
116 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 5 (2012).
57. UNHRC, General Comment No. 31 supra n. 23, para. 2.
58. A thesis that goes against the voluntarist approach defended by Prosper
Weil, who was seeing in obligations erga omnes and, of course, in jus
cogens a threat for classic international law. P. Weil, ‘Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law’, 77 American Journal of International
Law 413 (1983).
59. V. Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the Case-law of
the ECtHR: an Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loop-
hole for the Reinforcement of the Teleology of Human Rights? Between
Evolution and Systemic Integration’, 31 Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law 621, at 641 et seq (2010).
60. On the variety of doctrinal approaches on hierarchy in international law,
see J.H.H. Weiler and A.L. Paulus, ‘The Structure of Change in Interna-
tional Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?’ 8
European Journal of International Law 545, especially at 558 et seq.
(1997).
61. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from The
Diversification and Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study
Group of the International Law Commission, finalised by Martti Kosken-
niemi. ILC Fifty-eighth session. A/CN. 4/L.682, para. 408. See also
J. Vidmar ‘Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards
a Vertical International Legal System’, in E. De Wet and J. Vidmar
(eds.), Hierarchy in International Law. The Place of Human Rights,
at 23-25 (2012).
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material hierarchy,62 which is of course closely linked,
and indeed derived from their material importance,63
that is to say, from the fact that they have been set to
protect important societal values (human rights) or
common interests (environmental protection) that,
inevitably, affect everyone’s life within the community.
However, the effect of that type of normative supremacy
described here has nothing to do with the force of jus
cogens. It consists of a simple (yet effective and, indeed,
essential) priority in the fulfilment of the obligation, on
the basis and under the conditions set by the wide-
spread64 use, in the ‘age of balancing’,65 principle of
proportionality, which only operates on an ad hoc basis,
that is, within the context, or in the light of the particu-
lar circumstances of each separate case.
Jus cogens is a ‘guillotine’ clause. Inherently66 conflicting
rules are deprived of any effect, that is, of any normative
force. Erga omnes treat conflicting norms in a more ‘gen-
tle’ way. Unlike jus cogens, they are susceptible to limita-
tions. Yet, for these limitations to be permitted, they
must satisfy the exigencies of proportionality. As
explained, this tool only operates on an ad hoc basis. Far
from giving standardised, pre-established or automatic
results, its outcomes, that is, the assessment of the legal-
ity of a limitation/derogation (for the purposes, in that
instance, of compliance with a conflicting international
obligation), depend on the particular circumstances of
the case. In that sense, proportionality is a tool for the
establishment (also) of ad hoc, i.e., occasional priorities
in fulfilment, which only apply within the particular
context of a given case.
This is, besides, what the ECtHR did when, very
recently, it applied proportionality in the context of the
famous Nada case, whereby, the court required the
defendant state to limit the effect of a Chapter VII UN
SC Resolution that was imposing sanctions against the
applicant, to the extent that this was necessary for the
62. B. Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a
Practitioner’, 20 European Journal of International Law 265, at 272 et
seq. (2009).
63. See D. Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’, 100 Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 318 (2006); M. Ragazzi, The Concept
of International Obligations Erga Omnes (1997); and E. de Wet, ‘The
International Constitutional Order’, 55 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 51, at 57 (2006), et seq. Contra A. Pellet, ‘Conclusions’,
in C. Tomuschat and J. Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the
International Legal Order, at 418 (2006); I.D. Seiderman, Hierarchy in
International Law: The Human Rights Dimension, at 125 (2001).
64. On the spread of proportionality and the various reasons why it is
nowadays so commonly applied in a big number of legal systems, see
A. Stone Sweet and Jud Matthews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Glob-
al Constitutionalism’, 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 74 et
seq., and M. Cohen-Eliya and I. Porat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture
of Justification’, 59 American Journal of Comparative Law 464 et seq.
(2011).
65. T.A. Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’, 96 Yale
Law Journal 943 (1987).
66. Concerning the typology of normative conflicts, see J. Pauwelyn, ‘Con-
flict of Norms in Public International Law’, in How WTO Law Relates to
other Rules of International Law, at 176 (2003).
applicant’s rights under the ECHR to be protected.67
The reference the court makes to harmonisation68 is in
reality a euphemism, that is, a less ‘aggressive’ way to
explain that, given the particular facts of the case, it was
necessary to limit the effect of the UN SC resolution.
This is another way to imply that priority ought to be
given in the fulfilment of the (erga omnes partes) rule at
issue of the ECHR over a conflicting obligation stem-
ming from the UN Charter and its Article 103. The key
tool here is proportionality. If another similar case ever
occurs, proportionality will again be of usefulness, as a
means to assess from the beginning the facts of the new
case.
Actually, this is the same intellectual process we all do
in any situation of conflict of obligations/aims. Setting
the sort of priority described here is not the prerogative
of the international judge. Although only the latter has
the authority to declare the legality of the outcome of
that intellectual process, in reality, state agents are intui-
tively doing the same thing in the ‘everyday life’ of
international law. Think for instance of the banal exam-
ple of a diplomatic bag passing through border control
in an airport. State officials know that they are ‘under
no circumstances’ allowed to inspect the bag. What if
they listened to a baby inside that bag crying? Maybe
they do not conceive it in these terms, but in reality they
are facing something more than a moral dilemma, as, in
the context of the case, there is also an apparent conflict
of legal obligations. The first obligation requires them to
protect the baby’s life, under the positive effect given to
the human right to life. The second obligation calls
them to abstain from opening the bag. Each rule has its
own ratio and they both pursue a legitimate aim. The
first has been established to allow co-existence and co-
operation, and to facilitate the diplomatic relationship
between nations. The second’s telos is the protection of
human life.
Proportionality in that example may work either way,
that is, with respect to the limitation of each one of the
two rules. In the first case, it would be applied as a
means to assess the legality of the opening of the bag to
save the baby’s life. The criterion would be necessity,
i.e. whether opening the bag is necessary for saving that
life. In the opposite scenario, proportionality would test
the legality of the limitation of the baby’s right to life, in
order to comply with the rule on the inviolability of dip-
lomatic bags. Either way, the function of proportionality
remains unchanged. Both roads would lead to a com-
mon result on the basis of one single key concept: neces-
sity.
Necessity here operates at a dual level. The more tech-
nical dimension of it consists in assessing the legality of
a limitation on the basis of what would be necessary in
67. Nada v. Switzerland (ECtHR, Judgment) 10593/08, 12 September
2012, paras 181 et seq., especially paras 196-198. See also the critical
comments by Judge Malinverni, who, in his concurring opinion (espe-
cially paras 11 et seq.) is directly raising the question of hierarchy of
rules in case of conflict between UN-stemming obligations and human
rights.
68. Ibid., para. 197.
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order to achieve a goal. The question asked here is what
is the level of limitation a right should suffer in the light
of the circumstances of the case. In the case of the right
to life, proportionality would test what kind of positive
conduct, such as opening the bag, would be necessary to
protect the baby’s life. If the same test were conducted
with regard to the inviolability of the diplomatic bag,
the question would be whether, to protect the diplomat-
ic relationship between the two states involved in the
scenario, it would be necessary not to take the positive
measures at issue, such as opening the bag. The sign
changes from positive to negative, but the ‘math’ is the
same. The outcome of the equation depends on the par-
ticular facts of the case, as well as on whether it is possi-
ble to harmonise the two obligations. For instance, it
would make a big difference if a scanning machine were
available, enabling to inspect the bag with minimal
interference to the inviolability of the diplomatic bag.
This is the procedural aspect of necessity in proportion-
ality.69 It enables balancing means with ends.70
Yet, it is the second and more substantive dimension of
necessity that mainly interests this article. The limita-
tion (the legality of which is tested through proportion-
ality) is a means to an end. Means and ends cannot be
truly disconnected. Opening the bag is a means to res-
cue a life. At stake is a value that is common to the inter-
national community as a whole, and this is why the obli-
gation is integral and owed erga omnes. Abstaining from
opening the bag is a means for the protection of cooper-
ation at the inter-state level. As such, this aim is primar-
ily linked to the individual interests of a pair of
states – and this is what makes the obligation bilateralis-
able. The role of necessity in that second level is to
examine whether these two goals (the object and pur-
pose of each rule) are worthy enough on the basis of
their material content and importance to justify a (nec-
essary or in different legal systems reasonable) limitation
to the conflicting goal/obligation. The particular cir-
cumstances of the case remain of importance. In the
example discussed here, the criterion would be the con-
sequences (starting from a simple degradation of bilater-
al relationship, and extending to acts of self-help) that
the opening of the bag would have in the relationship of
the two countries, or, in the opposite scenario, the con-
sequences for the baby’s life and health. In both cases,
the task of proportionality would be the same. It would
be used to juxtapose two legitimate aims, to weigh their
material importance in the light of the facts of the case
and, if harmonisation was proven to be of limited effec-
69. Among other authors, T. Hickman, ‘Proportionality: Comparative Law
Lessons’, Judicial Review 38 et seq. (2007). On the three distinctive
‘sub-principles’ (suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu)
that apply within the framework of the overall test of proportionality
and their origins in the German constitutional tradition, see R. Alexy,
‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’, 16 Ratio Juris 135
(2003).
70. On the function of proportionality as a balancing ‘mechanism’ on the
basis of the test of necessity, among many other authors, see A. Barak,
‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’, 57 University of Toronto
Law Journal 369 (2011) and of the same author, ‘Proportionality and
Principled Balancing’, 4 Law and Ethics of Human Rights 3 (2010).
tiveness, to finally give priority to one of the two goals
and respective rules by authorising or prohibiting a lim-
itation.71
Unlike jus cogens, in the case of conflict with erga omnes
obligations both rules remain in force. Yet, in the light
of the facts of the case, only one can be given priority.
Outside facts, the key here is the value, the weight and
the material importance of the aims/rules at stake. The
argument the article wishes to contribute is that, over-
all,72 in most situations of conflict, the test of propor-
tionality will make the rules erga omnes prevail over the
synallagmatic rules that have been designed to protect
individual state interests. The reason is simple. In
abstracto, protecting a life is more important than diplo-
matic correspondence. This is, after all, why that obliga-
tion is owed erga omnes. In concreto, proportionality will
provide for the necessary adjustments, in the light of the
particular facts of each case.
The conclusion that can be reached is that, indeed, erga
omnes do not develop ‘hard’ supremacy of the kind of jus
cogens. However, they do prevail over conflicting obliga-
tions in that, under conditions, priority is given to their
effect. The way one will express this idea depends on
whether s/he sees the glass half full or half empty.
From a more traditional perspective that would empha-
sise sovereignty, states shall be free to create and apply
any rule they want, unless if they disproportionately
infringe the societal values obligations erga omnes pro-
tect. This is how the Lotus court would express that
idea. If, on the other hand, the emphasis is put on public
order and the community of interests, then states shall
not be allowed to do so, unless they satisfy proportional-
ity. Yet, in both cases, the bottom line is common.
Despite the voluntarist origins of the international sys-
tem, the concept of a community of interests does not
leave the will of states unaffected. This is how interna-
tional law may protect the fundamental values/common
interests of its society, which, of course, extend well
beyond jus cogens. The type and the effect of the
supremacy are different, but the logic, the function and
the purpose are common in both erga omnes and jus
cogens. This is, besides, what distinguishes obligations
erga omnes from the rest of jus dispositivum.
71. See J. Waldron [‘Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor
Schauer’, 45 Hastings Law Journal (1993-1994) 817 et seq.], who
argues that when conflicting values can be brought into relation with
one another, the balancing process enables the establishment of priori-
ties.
72. Yet, everything depends on the particular circumstances of the case.
See for instance the examples given earlier with regard to the clash
between access to justice and sovereign immunities. Yet, if the facts of
the case were different, the outcome of proportionality would have
been equally different. It makes a significant difference for instance to
request that immunity is raised in order to obtain a pecuniary compen-
sation for heinous international crimes, which, however, took place dec-
ades ago and to apply the test of proportionality in order to assess
whether an imminent danger to the life or an ongoing grave violation
of human rights may justify raising immunity.
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3.2 Due Diligence: The State as ‘Good
Samaritan’
3.2.1. Lex Lata
The second ‘tool’ pre-dates human rights. The famous
principle of due diligence73 has formed part of interna-
tional law for several decades now as a generic matrix
that alters the scope of international obligations. One
does not need to go back to Alabama or to Island of Pal-
mas. The principle has been recognised by the ICJ on
numerous occasions – at the beginning indirectly74 and,
more recently, in a very outspoken way, confirming its
customary foundations in positive international law.75
Due diligence is a general principle that applies well
beyond human rights. However, it matured within the
field of human rights or, more accurately, when human
rights where embodied within it, thanks to the case law,
mainly of the Inter-American and the European courts
of human rights, giving an indirect-horizontal (positive)
effect to the rights safeguarded by their respective con-
ventional frameworks. As far as the interrelationship
between due diligence and human rights is concerned,
the I-ACHR has recognised that,
in principle, any violation of rights recognized by the
Convention carried out by an act of public authority
or by persons who use their position of authority is
imputable to the state. However, this does not define
all the circumstances in which a state is obligated to
prevent, investigate and punish human rights viola-
tions, nor all the cases in which the state might be
found responsible for an infringement of those rights.
An illegal act which violates human rights and which
is initially not directly imputable to a state (for exam-
ple, because it is the act of a private person or because
the person responsible has not been identified) can
lead to international responsibility of the state, not
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due
diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it
as required by the Convention.76
For due diligence to obtain full and concrete content it
needs to be applied with regard to a specific internation-
al rule, such as human rights. The principle expands the
effect and scope of application of the rule within which
it is embodied to the extent that the state is not only
73. On due diligence, see R. Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘Due Diligence’ e responsa-
bilità internazionale degli Stati (1989), as well as, by the same author,
‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsi-
bility of States’, 35 German Yearbook of International Law 9 (1992).
See also R.P. Barnidge, ‘The Due Diligence Principle under International
Law’, 8 International Community Law Review 81 (2006).
74. The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland v. Albania) Judgment of 9 April 1949 ICJ Reports 1949,
4 at 22; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion. ICJ Reports 1996, 226 at para. 29, Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall (supra n. 22) at para. 141, ICJ, Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (supra n. 22) at para. 179.
75. Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, (Argentina v. Uru-
guay) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14 at para. 101.
76. Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, July 29, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser.C) No. 4 at para. 172.
expected to abstain from breaking that rule by actions or
omissions that are directly attributable to it, but also to
‘fight’ (i.e. prevent, punish, etc.) a breach of the law that
is either attributable to a third subject or owing to a gen-
eral situation that cannot be personified, such as social
or natural phenomena.
Due diligence is quasi-absent from the aforementioned
ILC norms.77 The difference between so-called objec-
tive responsibility, stemming from the fact that the state
is directly causing the wrongful result attributable to it,
and responsibility because of the failure of the state to
demonstrate diligence, that is, to ‘fight’ the wrongful
conduct of another person/situation causing the wrong-
ful result, is that the former requires states to guarantee
certain results. On the contrary, for the state to escape
responsibility for lack of diligence, it needs to demon-
strate that it did everything that was possible to fight
wrongfulness. To comply with diligence, states need to
suitably use the pertinent means at their disposal.78 By
definition, due diligence generates obligations of
means,79 that is, a concept that is directly linked to the
old idea of responsibility because of ‘state
fault’80 – requiring a subjective appreciation of the avail-
able means, their suitability and the necessity to make
good use of them in order to reach the goals of due dili-
gence.
3.2.2 Lex Ferenda
The potential of due diligence is indeed great, as we are
only now starting to understand how this principle can
find application in a wide range of areas of international
law. Due diligence not merely requires the state to pas-
sively abstain from breaking the law, but also to actively
strive to guarantee (to the best of its ability) that the
other subjects of the society (especially those under its
jurisdiction) be prohibited and prevented from breaking
the law as well. Yet, the article wishes to point to two
different directions, which are both relevant to the idea
of the humanisation of international law and to the
potential offered in that respect by due diligence.
77. The ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States make an implicit refer-
ence to due diligence in Art. 14(3) that concerns the temporal dimen-
sion of the obligations to prevent. In that case the wrongful act for fail-
ure to prevent is continuous. See also the commentaries of the ILC dis-
cussing Arts. 9 and 10 of the norms. However, due diligence is not
excluded per se; simply the ILC norms do not deal with fault, but leave
that to the substance and scope of the primary norms.
78. P.M. Dupuy, ‘Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Clas-
sification of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in Relation
to State Responsibility’, 10 European Journal of International Law 371,
at 378-382 (1999).
79. González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico, November 16, 2009, 1988
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 20 at para. 252. See also A. Tunk, ‘La
Distinction des Obligations de Résultat et des Obligations de Diligence’,
La semaine juridique (Juris-classeur périodique), 1945, No. 449, as well
as J. Combacau, ‘Obligations de résultat et obligations de comporte-
ment. Quelques questions et pas de réponse’, in D. Bardonnet et al.
(eds.), Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter. Le droit international: unité et
diversité (1981), at 181-204.
80. P.M. Dupuy, ‘Le fait générateur de la responsabilité internationale des
États’, 188 RCADI, at 102-103 (1986); and Pisillo Mazzeschi (1992)
supra n. 73 at 18-21 and 49-50.
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• Returning to the State: Due Diligence as a
Substitute to the Absence of Individual
Responsibility
The first direction concerns the power due diligence has
to act as a supplement or even a substitute to the
absence of a mature and fully developed framework of
primary and secondary obligations directly regulating at
the international level the conduct of so-called non-state
actors. Indeed, human rights have been a major catalyst
in the change of international law. However, society is
now realising – often in a rather painful way – that the
human being is not only a ‘victim’ in need of protection.
The private factor proved to be an increasingly influen-
tial global player, having the power to affect the global
economy, use force against states and other non-state
actors, or to act as a pirate, a cyber-aggressor or a terro-
rist. A truly humanised order should contain rules regu-
lating that conduct, establishing obligations for these
private activities and holding their authors directly
responsible at the international level. Yet, we know that,
with the exception of the handful of international
crimes, international law contains no such rules – at
least not hard ones. Apparently, this creates a lacuna, a
legal and institutional gap that somehow needs to be
covered.
This is what due diligence can contribute. Within a
state-centric legal system, apart from, or rather than
resorting to ambiguous constructions and soft-law solu-
tions about the responsibility of the private entities that
breach human rights, pollute the environment or
destroy monuments of the common cultural heritage of
humanity, we can turn to the state.81 Due diligence
makes this possible. It requires states to protect, that is,
to prevent – mainly through regulation – and punish
wrongfulness. Clearly, it is an oblique solution. But it is
a solution. Instead of holding accountable the subject to
which the illicit conduct is directly attributable, we turn
to its ‘legal guardian’. We expect states to control the
author of the wrongfulness and, if they unduly fail to do
that in an effective way, we (also) hold them responsi-
ble – instead of or next to the subject that has directly
caused the wrongful result. It is the needs of the society
that require states to assume part of the responsibility
for the conduct of those found under their jurisdiction.
After all, sovereignty should not only mean rights and
prerogatives, but also responsibility and exercise of
power against those found under that sovereignty.
Of course, conditions apply. First, the state only has an
obligation of means, that is, it will only be held liable if
it had the means to act against conduct producing
results prohibited by international law and it failed to do
so. Second, in principle, the state must be exercising
jurisdiction over the author of the illicit conduct. How-
ever, this is yet another huge topic of international law,
which cannot be dealt with in the article. Suffice to
81. This is actually, one of the three ‘paths’ suggested by J. Ruggie, Guiding
Principles supra n. 28, principles 1-10. See also Tzevelekos, supra n. 47,
suggesting a ‘pathway’ on the basis of due diligence to hold responsible
the home state for the wrongful conduct of its investors acting over-
seas.
mention that both active and passive personality will be
of great usefulness in extending due diligence obliga-
tions beyond state borders. Limiting jurisdiction to the
territorial basis is not what the nature of the social
behaviours at issue (such as international terrorism or
cyber-crimes) requires. The needs of the globalised
society are different.
• Combining the Two Tools: L’Union Fait la Force
Last but not least, as Belgians say, eendracht maakt
macht (it is unity that makes strength). The idea promo-
ted here is the ‘synergy’ between the two systemic tools
discussed in the article. The combination of the obliga-
tion to protect (limited for the purposes of the article to
due diligence) with erga omnes may have a number of
very interesting consequences.
First, if the obligation breached by a subject under the
jurisdiction of a state is of erga omnes nature, then the
positive obligation under due diligence of that state to
prevent and punish that conduct will equally be erga
omnes. Ergo, each and every state in international law
will be allowed to react against the negligence of that
state to make use of the pertinent positive measures.
The second scenario is slightly more complicated. It
actually relies on the previous one, but is also adding a
transnational element. According to that scenario, either
the author (the perpetrator) of the breach of an interna-
tional obligation a state owes erga omnes, or the victim of
that conduct, are somehow (in principle, through
nationality) linked to a third state. For instance, the citi-
zen of state X, visits state Z as a tourist, where s/he sex-
ually abuses a child. This will have two main conse-
quences. First, more than two states (that is, as many
states as the bases of jurisdiction, such as territory, pas-
sive or active nationality) will be expected to exercise
concurrent (and for some of the states extraterritorial)
jurisdiction in the light of due diligence.
Second, invoking the responsibility of the other
involved states in case of failure on behalf of them to act
in a diligent manner, will be one of the means82 available
to the state to fulfil its own obligations under due dili-
gence. In that case, due diligence may convert the facul-
ty, that is the discretion states enjoy to internationally
(re)act in order to protect the values and common inter-
ests covered by erga omnes obligations into an obligation
(of means) to actively (that is through positive action)
protect these values and interests. In the light of due dil-
igence, what is seen as a simple faculty, allowing states
to act as ‘good samaritans’ whenever they feel like,
transforms into a positive obligation of international
law, calling the state to fight the breach of an erga omnes
violation, to the best of its ability of course. However, as
already explained, in principle, the way things stand
82. Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia (supra n. 19) at para. 333,
‘The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic
means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisa-
tions, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and free-
doms defined in the Convention.’ See also, Catan and others v. Moldo-
va and Russia (Judgment) 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06,
19 October 2012 at paras 146-147.
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now, this would not concern diplomatic protection,83 as
it remains a ‘privilege’ for states, and not an obliga-
tion…
4. A Relativist Conclusion:
Bridging the Worlds of ‘Is’
and ‘Ought’
One cannot be but sympathetic, if not supportive, to the
noble intentions of the theory of humanisation – espe-
cially if one happens to share the values, that is, the
material sources that underpin and nurture the legal
rules protecting the human being at the international
level. Yet, it is one thing to ethically agree with the idea
and the aims of human rights, both as an ideology, as
well as positive international law, and another thing to
suggest that human rights have given an entirely new,
human face to what has traditionally been a sovereignist
legal order. As it is one thing to understand the process
of humanisation of international law as a (to the author’s
understanding, legitimate) movement, calling for
change (towards what in the eyes of many, one should
consider, constitutes western values);84 but it is some-
thing different to perceive that very aim as a universal,
well-digested, mature reality in positive law that has
already succeeded in radically reforming the interna-
tional order, so that the latter may now be seen as pre-
dominantly humanised, with sovereignty receding ‘ipso
jure’ in favour of the protection of community interests.
On the other hand, one needs to acknowledge that inter-
national law has always been vacillating between apology
and utopia. This is the price it has to pay for maintain-
ing its decentralised architecture. It originated as – and
it predominantly remains – an inter-subjective system of
a limited number of primary subjects, which are, all,
legally equal and sovereign. The preservation of sover-
eignty impeded the emergence of a centralised system
that would comprise the principal features of a mature
legal order, including what Hart calls the ‘luxury’ of a
rule of recognition.85 International rules heavily depend
on state voluntas, that is, in a sense, on the auto-limita-
tion of the powers of the sovereign subjects.86 This leads
to lack of objectiveness, with scholars wondering if gen-
eral international law can ever form a coherent ensem-
ble, organised as a system – and not a bric-à-brac.87
83. In that respect, see the critical comments made by R.-P. Mazzeschi,
‘Impact on the Law of Diplomatic Protection’, in Kamminga and Schei-
nin (eds.), supra n. 1 at 222 et seq.
84. On ‘cultural imperialism’, among others, see: M. Koskenniemi, ‘Interna-
tional Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal’, 16 European
Journal of International Law, at 113-124 (2005).
85. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, at 214 and mainly 235 (1994).
86. L. Condorelli, ‘Is Leviathan Still Holding Sway Over International Deal-
ings?’, in Cassese supra n. 2.
87. J. Combacau, ‘Le droit international. Bric-à-brac ou système?’, Archives
de philosophie du droit, tome 31 (Le système juridique), at 96-97
(1986).
Within such an order, it is only natural that the line sep-
arating the lex lata from the lex ferenda becomes a fine
one, and that the world of the positive ‘is’ mélanges with
the universe of the normative ‘should’ – especially when
the main vehicle for the generation of general interna-
tional law is a par excellence circular88 and, in essence,
informal source that fails to favour legal certainty and
which, to some extent, is law – thanks, quite often, to
the judge –, because it should be law.89 In a nutshell,
apology and utopia, both, co-exist within international
law – and this is somewhat inherent to it. This is what
explains the bras de fer between ideology and positive
law, or the (in a number of instances, distorted) image/
vision of a humanised legal order, as opposed to the ‘old’
order, marked by Leviathan’s omnipotence.
Be it recognised as an auxiliary source of law, legal
scholarship is only of limited influence on law making.
In a number of instances (and despite its many other
successful cases) the theory-driven humanisation of
international law has been tested in the ‘real world’ of
international law, it has been duly appraised, and,
despite its humanistic purpose and good intentions,
proved to be of significantly lower weight than what
theory suggested it really is/should be. That’s life, as
they say. At least that is life in international law, whose
purpose is not only the protection of the values of the
humanity and the common interests of its society, but
also the peaceful co-existence of its sovereign actors.
The international system has traditionally been, and still
is, structured on the basis of inter-subjectiveness and
decentralisation. This cannot change, unless the pre-
miership of states is challenged. However, humanisation
is miles away from establishing a truly humanised sys-
tem. Such an ambition would require a combination of a
much more integrated society, elements of Kantian cos-
mopolitanism, a degree of centralisation, judicial
enforcement, and (why not?) individuals and other non-
state actors to be vested with legal capacities analogous
to their actual powers, in a system that would recognise
their impact in law making.90 This would be the end of
the world, as we know it. Be it a dynamic source of
change, humanisation is merely a process; as such it is
far from overturning the existing order of international
88. Koskenniemi (2005), supra n. 6 at 410 et seq. M. Koskenniemi ‘The
Politics of International Law’, 1 European Journal of International Law
4, at 23 (1990); M. Byers, ‘Custom, Power and the Power of Rules’,
International Relations and Customary International Law, at 136
(1999).
89. ‘[T]he genius of custom is to strike a bridge between the world of is
and the world of the ought’: C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensur-
ing the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’, 281 RCADI,
at 331 (2001). See also A.E. Roberts ‘Traditional and Modern
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconcilation’, 95
American Journal of International Law 757 (2001), at 757 et seq. who
defends the idea of a new custom of deductive nature mainly founded
upon opinio juris.
90. Which, one should admit, as an idea is really close to the concept of
global administrative law. For a comprehensive introduction, N. Krisch
and B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Admin-
istrative Law in the International Legal Order’, 17 European Journal of
International Law 1 (2006), as well as, B. Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of
“Law” in Global Administrative Law’, 20 European Journal of Interna-
tional Law 23 (2009).
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law and its foundations. Therefore, for it to succeed in
its aims, it needs to be adjusted to, that is, to be recon-
ciled with the structural characteristics of the interna-
tional legal system. The order will remain decentralised
and the state will preserve sovereignty. However, this
will have to be balanced with the need to protect some
important societal values and collective interests, within
a pluralistic, if not fragmented, social milieu.
This is the reason why this paper opted for a more mod-
est and ‘true-to-life’ approach that would allow humani-
sation to put international law’s feet on the ground.
Thus, it pointed to obligations erga omnes and to the
principle of due diligence, suggesting that, at its very
basis, the humanisation of international law contains
two powerful systemic tools. These tools do not aim
– and definitely do not suffice – to fully reshape or
reconstruct the system. Yet, they have been created by
the system. They are the products of a system, which,
while maintaining its basic structure, is slowly changing,
following the direction its society evolves.
As a reality of positive international law, the two named
tools are a proof of systemic evolution. As an opportuni-
ty, these very same tools have the potential to create the
necessary space within that state-centric system so that
the normative project of the humanisation – supported
by the necessary societal consensus – progressively
flourishes. Obligations erga omnes inherently reflect the
idea of an international public order that has the poten-
tial to erode the omnipotence of the sovereign state and
infiltrate other areas of law, which shall only be allowed
to produce their effects as long as and/or to the extent
that they do not infringe this (admittedly, still fragment-
ed and anaemic) public order. Collective enforcement
introduces a strong element of communitarianism with-
in the decentralised order. At the same time, the generic
concept of due diligence gives a new direction, a differ-
ent scope to international law. States are expected to not
only abstain from breaking the law, but also have, not a
faculty, but an obligation to protect subjects under their
jurisdiction in a pro-active way.
According to the paper, this is the very basis, the very
core of the humanisation of international law. As such, it
is partially a reality of positive law, and partially a poten-
tial, that is, a foundation and an opportunity for further
humanisation, but always within the limits and the con-
fines of a decentralised system marked by (an increas-
ingly eroded) sovereignty that operates in a pluralistic
social context. The potential for further humanisation
only starts there where the reality of the humanisation
ends. However, this is mainly a question of interpreta-
tion. Within a decentralised and highly disintegrated
legal order, it is unavoidable that ideology meets posi-
tive law and that the line separating the lex ferenda from
the lex lata becomes blurred. After all, one could
respond to Professor Pellet, everything is so ideological.
Even positivism. Only time, the dynamism of the soci-
ety and judges, having the authority to validate evolu-
tion by exercising jurisdiction, that is, by juris dire, will
tell. Until then, the battle shall go on…
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